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ABSTRACT—When two people witness an event, they often discuss it. Because 
memory is not perfect, sometimes this discussion includes errors. One person's errors can 
become part of another person's account, and this proliferation of error can lead to 
miscarriages of justice. In this article, we describe the social and cognitive processes 
involved. Research shows how people combine information about their own memory 
with other people's memories based on factors such as confidence, perceived expertise, 
and the social cost of disagreeing with other people. We describe the implications of this 
research for eyewitness testimony. 
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 When a police officer interviews an eyewitness, the hope is to tap into some 
pristine memory of the event. But memories are not complete descriptions of the past, nor 
are they always accurate. People forget information, confuse aspects of different events, 
and are influenced by what other people say. In this article, we focus on how 
eyewitnesses are affected by what other people say. This phenomenon—called memory 
conformity or social contagion of memory—builds upon classic work on social-influence 
processes and the malleability of memory. Three related processes contribute to memory 
conformity. Asch’s (1955) work shows how normative influences guide behavior. In 
social situations, people will report something they do not believe in order to comply 
with group norms and to gain social acceptance. Sherif (1936) showed that informational 
influences can lead people to report what somebody else said because they are dependent 
on the other person for information in order to resolve uncertainty. In such cases, people 
may continue to report what somebody else said even after they are removed from the 
social situation, because they believe the other person. Loftus (2005) showed that people 
will report information suggested after an event because they have developed a false 
memory for it. We review recent research illustrating how these three processes can lead 
to eyewitnesses inaccurately reporting information that they heard from co-witnesses. 
Eyewitnesses often talk with each other. A survey of eyewitnesses taking part in 
line-ups revealed that most saw the crime with other people present and over half of these 
people talked with the co-witnesses (Skagerberg & Wright, 2008). Because people may 
attend to different parts of an event and misremember parts, the discussion can include 
differences in memories and inaccuracies. These inaccuracies may spread among 
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eyewitnesses. A well-known case in which this occurred was the Oklahoma City 
bombing. Three employees were present when Timothy McVeigh rented the truck used 
in the bombing. Initially two of them thought McVeigh had been alone, but after 
discussing this with a third witness who believed there had been an accomplice, these 
witnesses also came to believe McVeigh had not been alone. The FBI now thinks this 
"accomplice" was an innocent person who rented a different truck the next day (Memon 
& Wright, 1999). 
A more recent example involves investigation of the murder of UK TV presenter 
Jill Dando. The police constructed a line-up with their suspect, Barry George. Only one 
of the 16 witnesses taking part in the initial line-up identified him. However, this witness 
took a taxi home with other witnesses and they discussed the identification. What she 
said appears to have influenced these other witnesses. One, for example, had not felt 
confident enough to make an identification during the original line-up but after the taxi 
ride felt "95% sure" that George was the man she had seen. Barry George was convicted 
at the original trial, but this conviction was overturned in August, 2008.  
 Three methods tend to be used in most memory-conformity research. In the first, 
pairs of participants are shown a large number of stimuli and then tested on these 
together. The first person responds, followed by the second person. What the first person 
says often affects what the second person says, thus showing similarities to the social-
psychology findings on conformity. Each participant contributes many data points, which 
means that fewer participants are needed when using this design than when using the 
other methods. The second method is more like the typical eyewitness situation and has a 
similar design to many postevent information studies. Participants see a crime sequence 
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and then discuss the event with other participants or confederates. Usually only a couple 
of misleading items are used, so that participants do not get suspicious. This means that 
more participants are needed with this method than with the first method. The final 
method provides participants with information about what other co-witnesses have said. 
A participant might be told either that 90% of the other people questioned thought the 
culprit was tall or that 30% thought the culprit was tall. Examples of each of these 
methods are provided in the remainder of this paper (see Schneider & Watkins, 1996; 
Gabbert, Memon, & Wright, 2007; and Skagerberg & Wright, in press). 
THREE REASONS WHY AN EYEWITNESS MAY REPORT THE WRONG 
INFORMATION 
 An eyewitness could respond according to what another eyewitness said for three 
reasons: not wanting to disagree with the other person, thinking the other person is right, 
and having constructed a memory based on what the other person said. We describe 
research relevant to each of these reasons and relate it to eyewitness situations (Table 1).  
The Cost of Disagreeing: Normative Influence 
Imagine that you are with friends reminiscing about the past and someone 
recounts an amusing incident but misreports some of the details. The details are not 
important (the cost of this memory error propagating is low) and it would be rude to 
correct the person (the cost of disagreeing is high). The storyteller turns to you to verify 
the story and you nod in agreement. This is an example of normative influence.  
In a forensic context, the interviewer can increase the cost of disagreeing and 
thereby encourage memory conformity. The interviewer may praise the interviewee for 
providing exculpatory information and may verbally punish the interviewee for providing 
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exonerating information. This can be a powerful suggestive technique, particularly when 
the interviewer is an authority figure and the interviewee a child. Consider the McMartin 
preschool case, in which positive statements included "Oh, you're so smart. I knew you'd 
remember," while negative statements included "Well, what good are you? You must be 
dumb." This was coupled with providing information about what other children allegedly 
said. For example (Schreiber et al., 2006, p. 29): 
 Interviewer: How about Naked Movie Star? You guys remember that game? 
 Child: No. 
 Interview: Everybody remembered that game. Let's see if we can figure it out. 
This established a situation in which the cost of disagreeing with the alleged statements 
of the other children was large. Under such situations, normative influences come into 
play, and a person may comply with others for instrumental reasons: to gain acceptance 
and affiliation, and to avoid censure or disapproval. In the McMartin case, many children 
reported they had been abused under this aggressive questioning. All charges were 
eventually dropped. 
 Baron, Vandello, and Brunsman (1996) conducted an eyewitness-identification 
study that illustrates normative influences. They used either an easy task or a difficult 
task. Results from the difficult task are described in the next section. The results from the 
easy task, in which most of the participants would have been aware which person in the 
line-up was the true culprit, illustrate how changing the cost of an error affects normative 
influences. People knowingly gave an errant response so as not to disagree with a 
confederate when they were told the results were of little importance (that they were pilot 
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data), but were less likely to conform when they were told the results were important 
(that they would be used by police and courts).   
Deciding Which Response Is Right: Informational Influence 
 After eyewitnesses discuss an event with co-witnesses, they are typically 
interviewed individually. Several studies have shown that many people continue to report 
suggested details in private. For example, Reysen (2005) tested participants individually 
after the group recognition task and found that the conformity effects persisted. This 
could be because they wanted to appear consistent with their public account. To address 
this, Wright, Gabbert, Memon, and London (2008) compared responding in secret to 
responding in public and found that both methods produced large conformity effects.  
 The more we trust the other person’s information and value that person's opinion, 
the more we are subject to their influence (Festinger, 1957). Several factors reliably 
predict when people will trust another person's memory more than their own. The most 
studied factor is relative confidence: People will trust somebody else's memory if the 
other person appears more confident (e.g., Schneider & Watkins, 1996). In the McVeigh 
case, the person who originally remembered an accomplice with McVeigh was more 
confident than the other two witnesses.  
 Participants will also trust another person if they believe that person was in a 
better situation to encode the event. Gabbert, Memon, and Wright (2007) showed pairs of 
participants several pictures. They told individual participants that they had either viewed 
a scene for half as long as the other person or for twice as long. The people who were told 
they viewed the scene for less time than the other person were more likely to believe the 
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other person than those who were told they had viewed the scene for longer than the other 
person.  
People also have beliefs about which groups of co-witnesses are most reliable. 
Skagerberg and Wright (2009) showed university students a video clip of a phone being 
stolen; this was followed by a line-up that did not include the culprit. The participants all 
chose someone, so all were in error. They were told that the study had also been run 
either with school children, who students believe have poor memories, or with police 
officers, who students believe have good memories. Participants were told either that 
most (97%) of these other people made the same choice as them or that few (4%) of them 
made the same choice. Participants were asked several questions about their own 
memory, including how certain they were and how difficult the task was. Research 
(Wright & Skagerberg, 2007) with eyewitnesses shows that responses to these questions 
change if a witness is told that the suspect was chosen or that an innocent filler was 
chosen. Figure 1 shows the mean for these responses; high values correspond to people 
thinking their memories are good. Those told about children's responses were not affected 
by the proportion of children agreeing with them. These participants judged the children's 
memories to be of so little value that they did not affect how they judged their own 
memories. Those told about police officers' responses were highly affected by the 
proportion agreeing with them. If more police officers agreed, their certainty was greater. 
The difficult identification task used by Baron et al. (1996) illustrates 
informational influence. The authors argued that if it is important to be correct, people 
would be likely to go along with a confederate because they would not trust their own 
memory. This is what they found. When it was important to be correct, having been told 
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that the data would be used by the police and courts, participants were more likely to go 
along with an errant confederate than when the data were less important, having been told 
that the data were just for a pilot study.  
Are New Memories Created? Memory Distortion 
 Cognitive psychologists differentiate between semantic memory, or simply 
believing that something is true (e.g., Edinburgh is the capital of Scotland), and having a 
memory that allows the person to mentally relive the event. This latter type is called an 
episodic memory (Tulving, 1983). An important question for both theory and application 
is whether these memory-conformity techniques just make people believe false 
information or whether actual episodic memories are created. 
 False memories can arise for a variety of reasons. In some cases the false 
information may be subtle, perhaps embedded in a misleading question. Loftus (1993) 
describes a good metaphor for this: "The new information invades us, like a Trojan horse, 
precisely because we do not detect its influence" (p. 530). Later when presented with the 
errant information, it may seem familiar and people may believe this familiarity is due to 
encoding the information as part of the original event. In other cases, people may 
explicitly encode the information and be aware of the source, but as time passes they may 
forget the source of the information, but not the information itself. In both of these 
situations, people make source-monitoring errors in which they falsely attribute the 
information suggested to them by the other person to information that they encoded as 
part of the original event (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). 
 Gabbert et al. (2007) had participants discuss a witnessed event with a co-witness 
and then had each participant provide an individual account of the event. They had 
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participants circle any items in their account that they remembered hearing from the co-
witness but did not remember from the original presentation. Participants said that about 
half of the errantly recalled items they remembered from the co-witness and about half 
they remembered from the original presentation. Similarly, Meade and Roediger (2002) 
ran a series of studies in which they showed participants a slide show of cluttered room 
scenes and then asked them to recall the room contents, along with a confederate who 
deliberately introduced false items. Later, on an individual recall test, many reported the 
false items suggested by the confederate. Meade and Roediger asked participants to say 
whether they remembered the information from the original slide show, the confederate, 
both, or neither. They found that, most of the time, when participants reported a 
suggested item, they either recalled it being in the slide show or being in the slide show 
as well as reported by the confederate. 
 Participants forced to choose the source of their responses may report that the 
information was from the original presentation even if they have no memory for it. 
Meade and Roediger (2002; Roediger, Meade & Bergman, 2001) asked participants 
whether their responses were based on recollecting the item within the scene (i.e., an 
episodic memory) or not. They found that many participants reported episodic memories 
from the original scene for a substantial number of the items which had only been 
suggested to them by the confederate. 
 Real cases of eyewitnesses also provide evidence for false memories based on 
what other people say. The case of the eyewitnesses who saw McVeigh rent the truck 
used in the Oklahoma City bombing and who only came to believe McVeigh had an 
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accomplice after speaking with the confident co-worker is a good example (Memon & 
Wright, 1999). 
SUMMARY 
 What does memory-conformity research mean for theories of social memory, and 
what are its implications for the legal system? For theories, it is important that 
researchers distinguish the three different processes that contribute to memory 
conformity. When people knowingly report errant information with others present, they 
are weighing the costs of disagreeing with the other person against the costs of being 
wrong. People may come to believe the suggested information because they trust the 
other person's memory more than their own. Moreover, having a belief and thinking 
about an event can lead to a person constructing an episodic memory. In order to 
differentiate these mechanisms, it is important to compare responding in private with 
responding in public, and to ask participants about their responses. Future research should 
involve manipulations that affect these three mechanisms differently; individual-
difference measures, which are hypothesized to associate with these mechanisms 
differently, should be used. 
 These findings have an important but simple implication for the legal system: 
Police officers should ask eyewitnesses whether they spoke with co-witnesses. 
Eyewitnesses will not always be able to remember if they spoke with co-witnesses, but it 
is worth asking. If they have talked with others, then their memories should not be 
thought of as independent evidence. The police can investigate whether any memories 
may be contaminated by these discussions. This is part of the British Psychological 
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Society's (2007) recommendations to the UK Home Office for conducting line-ups, and 
we encourage US jurisdictions to follow.  
 
Recommended Readings 
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the effects of socially encountered misinformation. Legal and Criminological 
Psychology, 9, 215–227. A study finding the size of the misinformation effect can 
be larger when the misinformation is introduced by another person than when it is 
only attributed to somebody else. 
Shaw, J.S., Garven, S., & Wood, J.M. (1997). Co-witness information can have 
immediate effects on eyewitness memory reports, Law & Human Behavior, 21, 
503–523. One of the first and most compelling demonstrations of co-witness 
influence on memory. 
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TABLE 1  
Three Processes That Contribute to Memory Conformity 
 
Process 
 
 
Description 
Normative influence 
 
Comparing the cost of disagreeing with the cost of 
being wrong. If the social cost of disagreeing is high, 
one may knowingly report errant information, 
particularly if making an error is not important. 
Informational influence 
 
Weighing the relative likelihood of the other person 
being correct versus oneself being correct. If the other 
person had a better view, has better memory in 
general, or is more confident, one is likely to believe 
that the other person's memory is correct. 
Memory distortion 
 
Information suggested by another person becoming, 
over time, part of an episodic memory. People can 
remember seeing information which they only heard 
from another eyewitness.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Participants’ beliefs about the quality of their own memories as a function of 
percentage of co-witnesses agreeing with them and who the co-witnesses were. 
(Skagerberg & Wright, 2009, Experiment 1). Y-axis scale is from 1 to 10 with high 
scores corresponding to good memories. “97% agreed” means participants were told 97% 
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of either children or police officers chose the same person in the line-up as the 
participant. Shown are means and standard errors. 
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